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Momtezuma Tuatara
26-04-09, 05:25 PM
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm58d0421a1.htm

April 21, 2009 / 58 (Dispatch);1-3http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/images/spacer.gifhttp://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/headers_footers/images/spacer.gifhttp://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/images/spacer.gif
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Swine Influenza A (H1N1) Infection in Two Children --- Southern California, March--April 2009

On April 17, 2009, CDC determined that two cases of febrile respiratory illness occurring in children who resided in adjacent counties in southern California were caused by infection with a swine influenza A (H1N1) virus.

The viruses from the two cases are closely related genetically, resistant to amantadine and rimantadine, and contain a unique combination of gene segments that previously has not been reported among swine or human influenza viruses in the United States or elsewhere.

Neither child had contact with pigs; the source of the infection is unknown.

Investigations to identify the source of infection and to determine whether additional persons have been ill from infection with similar swine influenza viruses are ongoing. This report briefly describes the two cases and the investigations currently under way. Although this is not a new subtype of influenza A in humans, concern exists that this new strain of swine influenza A (H1N1) is substantially different from human influenza A (H1N1) viruses, that a large proportion of the population might be susceptible to infection, and that the seasonal influenza vaccine H1N1 strain might not provide protection.

The lack of known exposure to pigs in the two cases increases the possibility that human-to-human transmission of this new influenza virus has occurred. Clinicians should consider animal as well as seasonal influenza virus infections in their differential diagnosis of patients who have febrile respiratory illness and who 1) live in San Diego and Imperial counties or 2) traveled to these counties or were in contact with ill persons from these counties in the 7 days preceding their illness onset, or 3) had recent exposure to pigs. Clinicians who suspect swine influenza virus infections in a patient should obtain a respiratory specimen and contact their state or local health department to facilitate testing at a state public health laboratory.


Case Reports


Patient A. On April 13, 2009, CDC was notified of a case of respiratory illness in a boy aged 10 years who lives in San Diego County, California. The patient had onset of fever, cough, and vomiting on March 30, 2009. He was taken to an outpatient clinic, and a nasopharyngeal swab was collected for testing as part of a clinical study.

The boy received symptomatic treatment, and all his symptoms resolved uneventfully within approximately 1 week. The child had not received influenza vaccine during this influenza season. Initial testing at the clinic using an investigational diagnostic device identified an influenza A virus, but the test was negative for human influenza subtypes H1N1, H3N2, and H5N1.

The San Diego County Health Department was notified, and per protocol, the specimen was sent for further confirmatory testing to reference laboratories, where the sample was verified to be an unsubtypable influenza A strain. On April 14, 2009, CDC received clinical specimens and determined that the virus was swine influenza A (H1N1).

The boy and his family reported that the child had had no exposure to pigs. Investigation of potential animal exposures among the boy's contacts is continuing. The patient's mother had respiratory symptoms without fever in the first few days of April 2009, and a brother aged 8 years had a respiratory illness 2 weeks before illness onset in the patient and had a second illness with cough, fever, and rhinorrhea on April 11, 2009.

However, no respiratory specimens were collected from either the mother or brother during their acute illnesses. Public health officials are conducting case and contact investigations to determine whether illness has occurred among other relatives and contacts in California, and during the family's travel to Texas on April 3, 2009.


Patient B. CDC received an influenza specimen on April 17, 2009, that had been forwarded as an unsubtypable influenza A virus from the Naval Health Research Center in San Diego, California. CDC identified this specimen as a swine influenza A (H1N1) virus on April 17, 2009, and notified the California Department of Public Health.

The source of the specimen, patient B, is a girl aged 9 years who resides in Imperial County, California, adjacent to San Diego County. On March 28, 2009, she had onset of cough and fever (104.3°F [40.2°C]).

She was taken to an outpatient facility that was participating in an influenza surveillance project, treated with amoxicillin/clavulanate potassium and an antihistamine, and has since recovered uneventfully. The child had not received influenza vaccine during this influenza season.

The patient and her parents reported no exposure to pigs, although the girl did attend an agricultural fair where pigs were exhibited approximately 4 weeks before illness onset. She reported that she did not see pigs at the fair and went only to the amusement section of the fair. The Imperial County Public Health Department and the California Department of Public Health are now conducting an investigation to determine possible sources of infection and to identify any additional human cases. The patient's brother aged 13 years had influenza-like symptoms on April 1, 2009, and a male cousin aged 13 years living in the home had influenza-like symptoms on March 25, 2009, 3 days before onset of the patient's symptoms. The brother and cousin were not tested for influenza at the time of their illnesses.


Epidemiologic and Laboratory Investigations

As of April 21, 2009, no epidemiologic link between patients A and B had been identified, and no additional cases of infection with the identified strain of swine influenza A (H1N1) had been identified. Surveillance data from Imperial and San Diego counties, and from California overall, showed declining influenza activity at the time of the two patients' illnesses. Case and contact investigations by the county and state departments of health in California and Texas are ongoing. Enhanced surveillance for possible additional cases is being implemented in the area.


Preliminary genetic characterization of the influenza viruses has identified them as swine influenza A (H1N1) viruses. The viruses are similar to each other, and the majority of their genes, including the hemagglutinin (HA) gene, are similar to those of swine influenza viruses that have circulated among U.S. pigs since approximately 1999; however, two genes coding for the neuraminidase (NA) and matrix (M) proteins are similar to corresponding genes of swine influenza viruses of the Eurasian lineage (1).

This particular genetic combination of swine influenza virus segments has not been recognized previously among swine or human isolates in the United States, or elsewhere based on analyses of influenza genomic sequences available on GenBank.*

Viruses with this combination of genes are not known to be circulating among swine in the United States; however, no formal national surveillance system exists to determine what viruses are prevalent in the U.S. swine population. Recent collaboration between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and CDC has led to development of a pilot swine influenza virus surveillance program to better understand the epidemiology and ecology of swine influenza virus infections in swine and humans.


The viruses in these two patients demonstrate antiviral resistance to amantadine and rimantadine, and testing to determine susceptibility to the neuraminidase inhibitor drugs oseltamivir and zanamivir is under way.

Because these viruses carry a unique combination of genes, no information currently is available regarding the efficiency of transmission in swine or in humans.

Investigations to understand transmission of this virus are ongoing.


Reported by: M Ginsberg, MD, J Hopkins, MPH, A Maroufi, MPH, G Dunne, DVM, DR Sunega, J Giessick, P McVay, MD, San Diego County Health and Human Svcs; K Lopez, MD, P Kriner, MPH, K Lopez, S Munday, MD, Imperial County Public Health Dept; K Harriman, PhD, B Sun, DVM, G Chavez, MD, D Hatch, MD, R Schechter, MD, D Vugia, MD, J Louie, MD, California Dept of Public Health. W Chung, MD, Dallas County Health and Human Svcs; N Pascoe, S Penfield, MD, J Zoretic, MD, V Fonseca, MD, Texas Dept of State Health Svcs. P Blair, PhD, D Faix, PhD, Naval Health Research Center; J Tueller, MD, Navy Medical Center, San Diego, California. T Gomez, DVM, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Svc, US Dept of Agriculture. F Averhoff, MD, F Alavrado-Ramy, MD, S Waterman, MD, J Neatherlin, MPH, Div of Global Migration and Quarantine; L Finelli, DrPH, S Jain, MD, L Brammer, MPH, J Bresee, MD, C Bridges, MD, S Doshi, MD, R Donis, PhD, R Garten, PhD, J Katz, PhD, S Klimov, PhD, D Jernigan, MD, S Lindstrom, PhD, B Shu, MD, T Uyeki, MD, X Xu, MD, N Cox, PhD, Influenza Div, National Center for Infectious and Respiratory Diseases, CDC.
Editorial Note:

In the past, CDC has received reports of approximately one human swine influenza virus infection every 1--2 years in the United States (2,3). However, during December 2005--January 2009, 12 cases of human infection with swine influenza were reported; five of these 12 cases occurred in patients who had direct exposure to pigs, six in patients reported being near pigs, and the exposure in one case was unknown (1,4,5).

In the United States, novel influenza A virus infections in humans, including swine influenza infections, have been nationally notifiable conditions since 2007.

The recent increased reporting might be, in part, a result of increased influenza testing capabilities in public health laboratories, but genetic changes in swine influenza viruses and other factors also might be a factor (1,4,5). Although the vast majority of human infections with animal influenza viruses do not result in human-to-human transmission (2,3), each case should be fully investigated to be certain that such viruses are not spreading among humans and to limit further exposure of humans to infected animals, if infected animals are identified. Such investigations should include close collaboration between state and local public health officials with animal health officials.


The lack of known exposure to pigs in the two cases described in this report increases the possibility that human-to-human transmission of this new influenza virus has occurred.

Clinicians should consider animal as well as seasonal influenza virus infections in the differential diagnosis of patients with febrile respiratory illness who live in San Diego and Imperial counties or have traveled to these areas or been in contact with ill persons from these areas in the 7 days before their illness onset. In addition, clinicians should consider animal influenza infections among persons with febrile respiratory illness who have been near pigs, such as attending fairs or other places where pigs might be displayed. Clinicians who suspect swine influenza virus infections in humans should obtain a nasopharyngeal swab from the patient, place the swab in a viral transport medium, and contact their state or local health department to facilitate transport and timely diagnosis at a state public health laboratory.

CDC requests that state public health laboratories send all influenza A specimens that cannot be subtyped to the CDC, Influenza Division, Virus Surveillance and Diagnostics Branch Laboratory.


Interim guidance on infection control, treatment, and chemoprophylaxis for swine influenza is available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/swine/recommendations.htm (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/swine/recommendations.htm).

Additional information about swine influenza is available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/swine/index.htm (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/swine/index.htm).
References


Vincent AL, Ma W, Lager KM, Janke BH, Richt JA. Swine influenza viruses: a North American perspective. Adv Virus Res 2008;72:127--54.
Myers KP, Olsen CW, Gray GC. Cases of swine influenza in humans: a review of the literature. Clin Infect Dis 2007;44:1084--8.
Wells DL, Hopfensperger DJ, Arden NH, et al. Swine influenza virus infections. Transmission from ill pigs to humans at a Wisconsin agricultural fair and subsequent probable person-to-person transmission. JAMA 1991;265:478--81.
Vincent AL, Swenson SL, Lager KM, Gauger PC, Loiacono C, Zhang Y. Characterization of an influenza A virus isolated from pigs during an outbreak of respiratory disease in swine and people during a county fair in the United States. Vet Microbiol 2009;online publication ahead of print.
Newman AP, Reisdorf E, Beinemann J, et al. Human case of swine influenza A (H1N1) triple reassortant virus infection, Wisconsin. Emerg Infect Dis 2008;14:1470--2.

* Available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Genbank (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Genbank).

Momtezuma Tuatara
26-04-09, 05:27 PM
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm58d0424a1.htm

Update: Swine Influenza A (H1N1) Infections --- California and Texas, April 2009

On April 21, 2009, CDC reported that two recent cases of febrile respiratory illness in children in southern California had been caused by infection with genetically similar swine influenza A (H1N1) viruses. The viruses contained a unique combination of gene segments that had not been reported previously among swine or human influenza viruses in the United States or elsewhere (1 (http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5815a5.htm)).

Neither child had known contact with pigs, resulting in concern that human-to-human transmission might have occurred. The seasonal influenza vaccine H1N1 strain is thought to be unlikely to provide protection. This report updates the status of the ongoing investigation and provides preliminary details about six additional persons infected by the same strain of swine influenza A (H1N1) virus identified in the previous cases, as of April 24. The six additional cases were reported in San Diego County, California (three cases), Imperial County, California (one case), and Guadalupe County, Texas (two cases). CDC, the California Department of Public Health, and the Texas Department of Health and Human Services are conducting case investigations, monitoring for illness in contacts of the eight patients, and enhancing surveillance to determine the extent of spread of the virus. CDC continues to recommend that any influenza A viruses that cannot be subtyped be sent promptly for testing to CDC. In addition, swine influenza A (H1N1) viruses of the same strain as those in the U.S. patients have been confirmed by CDC among specimens from patients in Mexico. Clinicians should consider swine influenza as well as seasonal influenza virus infections in the differential diagnosis for patients who have febrile respiratory illness and who 1) live in San Diego and Imperial counties, California, or Guadalupe County, Texas, or traveled to these counties or 2) who traveled recently to Mexico or were in contact with persons who had febrile respiratory illness and were in one of the three U.S. counties or Mexico during the 7 days preceding their illness onset.

Case Reports

San Diego County, California. On April 9, an adolescent girl aged 16 years and her father aged 54 years went to a San Diego County clinic with acute respiratory illness.

The youth had onset of illness on April 5. Her symptoms included fever, cough, headache, and rhinorrhea.

The father had onset of illness on April 6 with symptoms that included fever, cough, and rhinorrhea.

Both had self-limited illnesses and have recovered.

The father had received seasonal influenza vaccine in October 2008; the daughter was unvaccinated.

Respiratory specimens were obtained from both, tested in the San Diego County Health Department Laboratory, and found to be positive for influenza A using reverse transcription--polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), but could not be further subtyped.

Two household contacts of the patients have reported recent mild acute respiratory illnesses; specimens have been collected from these household members for testing. One additional case, in a child residing in San Diego County, was identified on April 24; epidemiologic details regarding this case are pending.
Imperial County, California. A woman aged 41 years with an autoimmune illness who resided in Imperial County developed fever, headache, sore throat, diarrhea, vomiting, and myalgias on April 12. She was hospitalized on April 15.

She recovered and was discharged on April 22. A respiratory specimen obtained April 16 was found to be influenza A positive by RT-PCR at the San Diego Country Health Department Laboratory, but could not be further subtyped. The woman had not been vaccinated against seasonal influenza viruses during the 2008--09 season. Three household contacts of the woman reported no recent respiratory illness.


Guadalupe County, Texas. Two adolescent boys aged 16 years who resided in Guadalupe County near San Antonio were tested for influenza and found to be positive for influenza A on April 15. The youths had become ill with acute respiratory symptoms on April 10 and April 14, respectively, and both had gone to an outpatient clinic for evaluation on April 15. Identification and tracking of the youths' contacts is under way.


Five of the new cases were identified through diagnostic specimens collected by the health-care facility in which the patients were examined, based on clinical suspicion of influenza; information regarding the sixth case is pending. The positive specimens were sent to public health laboratories for further evaluation as part of routine influenza surveillance in the three counties.

Outbreaks in Mexico

Mexican public health authorities have reported increased levels of respiratory disease, including reports of severe pneumonia cases and deaths, in recent weeks. Most reported disease and outbreaks are reported from central Mexico, but outbreaks and severe respiratory disease cases also have been reported from states along the U.S.-Mexico border. Testing of specimens collected from persons with respiratory disease in Mexico by the CDC laboratory has identified the same strain of swine influenza A (H1N1) as identified in the U.S. cases. However, no clear data are available to assess the link between the increased disease reports in Mexico and the confirmation of swine influenza in a small number of specimens. CDC is assisting public health authorities in Mexico in testing additional specimens and providing epidemiologic support. None of the U.S. patients traveled to Mexico within 7 days of the onset of their illness.

Epidemiologic and Laboratory Investigations

As of April 24, epidemiologic links identified among the new cases included 1) the household of the father and daughter in San Diego County, and 2) the school attended by the two youths in Guadalupe County. As of April 24, no epidemiologic link between the Texas cases and the California cases had been identified, nor between the three new California cases and the two cases previously reported. No recent exposure to pigs has been identified for any of the seven patients. Close contacts of all patients are being investigated to determine whether person-to-person spread has occurred.

Enhanced surveillance for additional cases is ongoing in California and in Texas. Clinicians have been advised to test patients who visit a clinic or hospital with febrile respiratory illness for influenza. Positive samples should be sent to public health laboratories for further characterization. Seasonal influenza activity continues to decline in the United States, including in Texas and California, but remains a cause of influenza-like illness in both areas.

Viruses from six of the eight patients have been tested for resistance to antiviral medications. All six have been found resistant to amantadine and rimantidine but sensitive to zanamivir and oseltamivir.

Reported by: San Diego County Health and Human Svcs; Imperial County Public Health Dept; California Dept of Public Health. Dallas County Health and Human Svcs; Texas Dept of State Health Svcs. Naval Health Research Center; Navy Medical Center, San Diego, California. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Svc, US Dept of Agriculture. Div of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and Control of Infectious Diseases; National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases; Influenza Div, National Center for Infectious and Respiratory Diseases, CDC.
Editorial Note:

In the United States, novel influenza A virus infections in humans, including swine influenza A (H1N1) infections, have been nationally notifiable conditions since 2007. Recent pandemic influenza preparedness activities have greatly increased the capacity of public health laboratories in the United States to perform RT-PCR for influenza and to subtype influenza A viruses they receive from their routine surveillance, enhancing the ability of U.S. laboratories to identify novel influenza A virus infections. Before the cases described in this ongoing investigation, recent cases of swine influenza in humans reported to CDC occurred in persons who either had exposure to pigs or to a family member with exposure to pigs. Transmission of swine influenza viruses between persons with no pig exposure has been described previously, but that transmission has been limited (2,3). The lack of a known history of pig exposure for any of the patients in the current cases indicates that they acquired infection through contact with other infected persons.

The spectrum of illness in the current cases is not yet fully defined. In the eight cases identified to date, six patients had self-limited illnesses and were treated as outpatients. One patient was hospitalized. Previous reports of swine influenza, although in strains different from the one identified in the current cases, mostly included mild upper respiratory illness; but severe lower respiratory illness and death also have been reported (2,3).

The extent of spread of the strain of swine influenza virus in this investigation is not known. Ongoing investigations by California and Texas authorities of the two previously reported patients, a boy aged 10 years and a girl aged 9 years, include identification of persons in close contact with the children during the period when they were likely infectious (defined as from 1 day before symptom onset to 7 days after symptom onset). These contacts have included household members, extended family members, clinic staff members who cared for the children, and persons in close contact with the boy during his travel to Texas on April 3. Respiratory specimens are being collected from contacts found to have ongoing illness. In addition, enhanced surveillance for possible cases is under way in clinics and hospitals in the areas where the patients reside. Similar investigations and enhanced surveillance are now under way in the additional six cases.

Clinicians should consider swine influenza infection in the differential diagnosis of patients with febrile respiratory illness and who 1) live in San Diego and Imperial counties, California, or Guadalupe County, Texas, or traveled to these counties or 2) who traveled recently to Mexico or were in contact with persons who had febrile respiratory illness and were in one of the three U.S. counties or Mexico during the 7 days preceding their illness onset. Any unusual clusters of febrile respiratory illness elsewhere in the United States also should be investigated.

Patients who meet these criteria should be tested for influenza, and specimens positive for influenza should be sent to public health laboratories for further characterization. Clinicians who suspect swine influenza virus infections in humans should obtain a nasopharyngeal swab from the patient, place the swab in a viral transport medium, refrigerate the specimen, and then contact their state or local health department to facilitate transport and timely diagnosis at a state public health laboratory. CDC requests that state public health laboratories promptly send all influenza A specimens that cannot be subtyped to the CDC, Influenza Division, Virus Surveillance and Diagnostics Branch Laboratory. As a precautionary step, CDC is working with other partners to develop a vaccine seed strain specific to these recent swine influenza viruses in humans.

As always, persons with febrile respiratory illness should stay home from work or school to avoid spreading infections (including influenza and other respiratory illnesses) to others in their communities. In addition, frequent hand washing can lessen the spread of respiratory illness (5). Interim guidance on infection control, treatment, and chemoprophylaxis for swine influenza is available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/swine/recommendations.htm (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/swine/recommendations.htm). Additional information about swine influenza is available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/swine/index.htm (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/swine/index.htm).
References


CDC. Swine influenza A (H1N1) infection in two children---Southern California, March--April 2009. MMWR 2009;58:400--2. (http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5815a5.htm)
Myers KP, Olsen CW, Gray GC. Cases of swine influenza in humans: a review of the literature. Clin Infect Dis 2007;44:1084--8.
Wells DL, Hopfensperger DJ, Arden NH, et al. Swine influenza virus infections. Transmission from ill pigs to humans at a Wisconsin agricultural fair and subsequent probable person-to-person transmission. JAMA 1991;265:478--81.
Newman AP, Reisdorf E, Beinemann J, et al. Human case of swine influenza A (H1N1) triple reassortant virus infection, Wisconsin. Emerg Infect Dis 2008;14:1470--2.
Ryan MA, Christian RS, Wohlrabe J. Handwashing and respiratory illness among young adults in military training. Am J Prev Med 2001;21:79--83.

magical1
26-04-09, 07:09 PM
Should we start a one stop shop for what anyone could or should be doing for their immune systems? Not just now but always?

I've started stock piling olive leaf extract, garlic extract... etc etc etc.

I would like to pass onto others what I would do if this is to become a worry... but should I be worried?

What do you reckon?

Momtezuma Tuatara
26-04-09, 07:28 PM
don't see a need to be worried, but perhaps there is a need for preparation.

Starting a thread is a great idea Magical1.

Do you want to start a thread on Influenza, and what people can do?

make it a sticky?

Mommy0406
26-04-09, 07:53 PM
I've read one article suggesting this variant may be similar to the 1918 flu in that it hits younger people harder. If that's the case, are the usual immune system strengtheners a good thing? I think I recall reading that the deaths from the Spanish flu happened because of a cytokine storm and that usually only occurs in people with strong and robust immune systems?

Momtezuma Tuatara
27-04-09, 08:32 AM
US Homeland Government website response:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/hsc-scen-3_pandemic-influenza.htm

Momtezuma Tuatara
27-04-09, 08:35 AM
You just can't tell what will happen when and where. Take this little known event:

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no04/05-0695.htm

Influenza poses a continuing public health threat in epidemic and pandemic seasons.

The 1951 influenza epidemic (A/H1N1) caused an unusually high death toll in England; in particular, weekly deaths in Liverpool even surpassed those of the 1918 pandemic.

We further quantified the death rate of the 1951 epidemic in 3 countries. In England and Canada, we found that excess death rates from pneumonia and influenza and all causes were substantially higher for the 1951 epidemic than for the 1957 and 1968 pandemics (by >50%).

The age-specific pattern of deaths in 1951 was consistent with that of other interpandemic seasons; no age shift to younger age groups, reminiscent of pandemics, occurred in the death rate. In contrast to England and Canada, the 1951 epidemic was not particularly severe in the United States.

Why this epidemic was so severe in some areas but not others remains unknown and highlights major gaps in our understanding of interpandemic influenza.

Momtezuma Tuatara
27-04-09, 08:49 AM
I'll do another thread on diagnosis and treatment.

Momtezuma Tuatara
27-04-09, 09:16 AM
Interim Recommendations for Facemask and Respirator Use in Certain Community Settings Where Swine Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Transmission Has Been Detected


http://www.wqad.com/news/sns-ap-il--swineflu-baxter,0,3115984.story (http://www.wqad.com/news/sns-ap-il--swineflu-baxter,0,3115984.story)


April 26, 2009 01:00 ET

This document provides interim guidance and will be updated as needed.
Detailed background information and recommendations regarding the use of masks and respirators in non-occupational community settings can be found on PandemicFlu.gov in the document Interim Public Health Guidance for the Use of Facemasks and Respirators in Non-Occupational Community Settings during an Influenza Pandemic (http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/community/maskguidancecommunity.html)http://www.cdc.gov/TemplatePackage/images/icon_out.png (http://www.cdc.gov/swineflu/masks.htm#linkPolicy).

Information on the effectiveness of facemasks1 (http://www.cdc.gov/swineflu/masks.htm#footnote1) and respirators2 (http://www.cdc.gov/swineflu/masks.htm#footnote2) for the control of influenza in community settings is extremely limited. Thus, it is difficult to assess their potential effectiveness in controlling swine influenza A (H1N1) virus transmission in these settings. In the absence of clear scientific data, the interim recommendations below have been developed on the basis of public health judgment and the historical use of facemasks and respirators in other settings.

In areas with confirmed human cases of swine influenza A (H1N1) virus infection, the risk for infection can be reduced through a combination of simple actions. No single action will provide complete protection, but an approach combining the following steps can help decrease the likelihood of transmission. These actions include frequent handwashing, covering coughs, and having ill persons stay home, except to seek medical care, and minimize contact with others in the household. Additional measures that can limit transmission of a new influenza strain include voluntary home quarantine of members of households with confirmed or probable swine influenza cases, reduction of unnecessary social contacts, and avoidance whenever possible of crowded settings.

When it is absolutely necessary to enter a crowded setting or to have close contact3 (http://www.cdc.gov/swineflu/masks.htm#footnote3) with persons who might be ill, the time spent in that setting should be as short as possible. If used correctly, facemasks and respirators can help prevent some exposures, but they should be used along with other preventive measures, such as avoiding close contact and maintaining good hand hygiene. When crowded settings or close contact with others cannot be avoided, the use of facemasks1 (http://www.cdc.gov/swineflu/masks.htm#footnote1) or respirators2 (http://www.cdc.gov/swineflu/masks.htm#footnote2) in areas where transmission of swine influenza A (H1N1) virus has been confirmed should be considered as follows:

Whenever possible, rather than relying on the use of facemasks or respirators, close contact with people who might be ill and being in crowded settings should be avoided.<LI sizset="14" sizcache="0">Facemasks1 (http://www.cdc.gov/swineflu/masks.htm#footnote1) should be considered for use by individuals who enter crowded settings, both to protect their nose and mouth from other people's coughs and to reduce the wearers' likelihood of coughing on others; the time spent in crowded settings should be as short as possible.
Respirators2 (http://www.cdc.gov/swineflu/masks.htm#footnote2) should be considered for use by individuals for whom close contact with an infectious person is unavoidable. This can include selected individuals who must care for a sick person (e.g., family member with a respiratory infection) at home.
These interim recommendations will be revised as new information about the use of facemasks and respirators in the current setting becomes available.

For more information about human infection with swine influenza virus, visit the CDC Swine Flu website (http://www.cdc.gov/swineflu/).

1 Unless otherwise specified, the term "facemasks" refers to disposable masks cleared by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use as medical devices. This includes facemasks labeled as surgical, dental, medical procedure, isolation, or laser masks. Such facemasks have several designs. One type is affixed to the head with two ties, conforms to the face with the aid of a flexible adjustment for the nose bridge, and may be flat/pleated or duck-billed in shape. Another type of facemask is pre-molded, adheres to the head with a single elastic band, and has a flexible adjustment for the nose bridge. A third type is flat/pleated and affixes to the head with ear loops. Facemasks cleared by the FDA for use as medical devices have been determined to have specific levels of protection from penetration of blood and body fluids.

2 Unless otherwise specified, "respirator" refers to an N95 or higher filtering facepiece respirator certified by the U.S. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).

3 Three feet has often been used by infection control professionals to define close contact and is based on studies of respiratory infections; however, for practical purposes, this distance may range up to 6 feet. The World Health Organization uses "approximately 1 meter"; the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration uses "within 6 feet." For consistency with these estimates, this document defines close contact as a distance of up to 6 feet.